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Corporate Law, directors’ duties and ESG interventions: 
Analysing pathways towards positive corporate impacts relating 
to ESG issues. 
 






Considering the steps necessary to steer companies towards positive impacts in 
terms of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues requires analysis of the 
way that corporate decisions are made, the effectiveness of existing initiatives to 
influence decision-making and the relationship that both have with corporate law 
itself. This article contributes to that process by considering the relationship that 
ESG initiatives have with corporate law.  It provides an analysis of the tensions that 
can exist between ESG initiatives and directors’ fiduciary duties, to investigate the 
threshold at which an ‘upper limit’ in ESG regulatory efficiency occurs. However it 
argues that directors’ duties should not be viewed in isolation when consideration 
is given to ESG issues, as they are only one part of the broader legal construct of 
‘the company’ – a construct that is predisposed towards negative outcomes for ESG 
concerns. It therefore argues that a broader approach is necessary and suggests 
pathways towards more effective development  of law and regulation in this 
sphere.  
  





Over the last forty to fifty years many of the initiatives, both legal and non-legal, 
that have had the purpose of influencing the decision-making of companies 
relating to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues have taken place 
as reactions to the way that  specific industries have been run and also in 
response to the corporate law and regulatory regimes to which they are subject. 
The diverse nature and volume of these initiatives creates challenges for the 
assessment of their effectiveness. However such evaluation is crucial in 
determining the most efficient and effective ways to steer corporate decision-
making in the future. It is in this space that the analysis of this article is situated. 
It considers the relationship between the decision-making made within the legal 
construct known as ‘the company’ and ESG initiatives, to determine the real 
effect that those ESG initiatives have on the priorities of company directors. 
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To do this it considers the key pillars of the corporate legal construct that can 
have an effect on ESG issues. As such it takes into account the directors’ duty to 
‘act in the best interest of a company’,1 ‘separate legal personality’ and ‘limited 
liability’. It is argued that these components operate in concert, in a manner 
which can predispose company directors to make decisions that ultimately have 
negative outcomes for ESG issues. Whilst much academic attention is given to 
directors’ duties in isolation, this article argues that the failure to take into 
account other components of the corporate legal construct obfuscates the overall 
purpose of companies and as such the legal framework that determines how 
directors are  ultimately obliged to make decisions relating to ESG issues. 
 
The article considers the different types of ESG initiatives that have been 
introduced by international organisations, governments, NGOs and companies 
themselves with the purpose of analysing their influence vis à vis corporate 
decision-making. Reference is made to a series of interviews conducted by the 
author with heads of corporate responsibility at listed companies that engage 
actively with ESG issues. The interviews alongside reference to research from 
other researchers, provide the basis for an analysis of the current drivers and 
determinants in the relationship between ESG initiatives and the priorities in 
corporate decision-making. The interviews were designed to investigate the 
threshold at which ESG initiatives may be subject to limitations in terms of their 
influence on corporate decision-making in the short and long term.  
 
The overall purpose of this analysis is to assist in the consideration of pathways 
for further reform within the field of ESG. In particular it seeks to assist in 
understanding the proportion of effort that should be allocated to developing 
further legal and non-legal initiatives that are extraneous to corporate law itself 
and the proportion of effort that should be devoted to addressing the underlying 
drivers or root causes of ESG issues which can, in part at least, be found within 
the legal construct of the corporation. 
 
 
2. The Corporate Legal Construct – Understanding why Corporate 
Decision-Makers make the Decisions that they do. 
 
 
This section considers the corporate legal construct of which directors’ duties 
are a part. It explores the function that the duty, ‘to act in the best interests of the 
company’ has when viewed in conjunction with  ‘separate legal personality’ and 
‘limited liability’; as a result it sheds light on the underlying drivers that affect 
corporate decision-making. It considers the relationship that all three factors 
                                                        
1 This broad definition is adopted for the purposes of this article as it provides a de facto 
representation of the legal obligation that company directors have in jurisdictions around the 
globe; see Adolfo Paolini (ed), Research Handbook on Directors’ Duties, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2014); Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties, 3rd edn (Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2016); Beate 
Sjåfell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen, and David Millon, ‘Shareholder Primacy: The 
Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies’ in Beate Sjåfell and Benjamin J. Richardson (eds) 
Company Law and Sustainability – Legal Barriers and Opportunities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 79-147 
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operating together can have on ESG strategies and as such explains why analysis 
of directors duties should not be taken in isolation when consideration is given 
to the development of initiatives designed to respond to ESG issues.2 
 
The historical foundations of directors duties, separate legal personality and 
limited liability in the context of ESG concerns, can be traced back over 220 years 
to the American War of Independence, the conclusion of which meant that newly 
formed states needed a method of incorporating businesses.3  In the absence of a 
monarch to grant the charters required for businesses to become incorporated, 
states in the United States adopted laws that enabled businesses to adopt the 
corporate form and as a result the birth of the modern corporation as we 
currently know it had taken place.  
 
The success of that model led other countries to adopt similar regimes 
themselves. The French,4 British,5 and Germans,6 all followed suite. The success 
of the corporate form for businesses subsequently spread throughout the world 
by colonisation, transplantation,7 and more recently through globalisation.8 In all 
jurisdictions it  has included the core features of separate legal personality, 
limited liability and directors’ duties;9 all of which are highly significant in terms 
of the outcomes for ESG issues. As such each of these features will be reviewed 
here in turn. 
 
One of the characteristics of separate legal personality is that any debts of the 
business are prima facie at least, those of the company itself and not those of its 
shareholders. Therefore it is understandable that business people see the 
corporate form as a highly desirable medium through which to conduct business. 
However, this can lead to decision-making that is ultimately pre-disposed to a 
higher levels of risk relating to ESG issues. This predisposition can be amplified 
when a parent company sets up subsidiary, as the parent company itself will not 
prima facie be directly liable for the debts or liabilities of that subsidiary.10 
Therefore the subsidiary can be used as vehicle through which commercial 
operations, that may have high risks for ESG concerns, can be conducted whilst 
restricting the liability of the parent company and its owners.  
                                                        
2 Stephen J. Turner, A Global Environmental Right (Abingdon: Earthscan by Routledge, 2014) 40-
4. 
3 Ibid 39. 
4 Mads Andenas & Frank Wooldridge, European Comparative Company Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 283. 
5 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 7 & 8 Vict. C. 110 & 111. 
6 Gesetz  betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbHG); see Klaus J. Hopt 
‘Comparative Company Law’ in  Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 1164. 
7  Hideki Kanda and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary 
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 887; Gerald McAlinn (ed), Japanese 
Business Law, (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2007) 109. 
8 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised in 2005). (Adopted at the Fifth Session 
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on December 29, 1993). 
9 Turner (n 2, 40-4); UN Global Compact Research Library ‘Sustainability and the Fiduciary Duty of 
Boards of Directors’ (2015). Available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/3791 (accessed 
9th April 2019). 
10 Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd edn. (OUP, 2007) 45-79. 
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The capacity that companies have to limit the liability of their shareholders 
similarly has the function of  providing a safe-haven for investors. As the 
personal liability of any investor is limited to the amount that they have 
subscribed to pay on the purchase of their shares, the directors of companies can 
potentially take greater risks vis à vis ESG issues without exposing that same 
level of risk to the shareholders. It can mean that  where a company causes harm 
to a community or the environment as a result of its operations, injured parties 
can be left without compensation in the event that the business becomes 
insolvent.  This also explains why limited liability companies are much more 
common than unlimited liability companies. 
 
In the 1790s when the corporation in its contemporary sense first emerged in 
the US, there were significant debates as to the desirability of  allowing 
companies to limit the liability of their shareholders.11 However when the state 
of New Hampshire became the first to allow companies to limit liability, all the 
other states swiftly followed suite.12 In the UK, although businesses were 
allowed to incorporate from 1844 onwards, it was not until 1855 that Parliament 
passed legislation which allowed companies to limit liability.13 
 
Both separate legal personality and limited liability would not have the same 
capacity to attract investors  if company law did not also integrate strict rules for 
those running companies to ensure that funds invested are used for the purposes 
expected by investors. It is on this rationale that directors’ duties have 
developed.14 In fact the necessity that company funds are used for commercial 
purposes to facilitate financial returns on investments has meant that in many 
jurisdictions there are very strict consequences for directors that fall foul of 
those responsibilities.15  
 
There have been attempts to influence or reinterpret the traditional duties that 
directors have towards companies, to ensure that human rights, environmental 
and governance issues are taken into account.16 However,  in all jurisdictions 
corporate law still requires the interests of the shareholders to be protected, and 
this is understandably translated in practice into the pursuit of commercial 
success.17 Even where the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders are 
represented in the letter of the law, they are generally not provided with the 
                                                        
11 Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 3rd edn (Minnesota: West 
Publishing Co. 1983) 25. 
12 Ibid 
13 Limited Liability Act 1855 (UK) 18 & 19 Vict. C. 133. 
14 L. C. B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1979) 255. 
15 See eg. Andenas & Wooldridge (n 4) 300-1; McAlinn (n 7) 109. 
16 See for example in the United Kingdom s.172 Companies Act; also under s166(2) of the Indian 
Companies Act (2013) directors have what appears to be a pluralistic responsibility to promote 
not only shareholders’ interests but also those of communities and the environment; also in 
France at the time of writing the government is considering PACTE,  a new code for companies. 
See https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/pacte-the-action-plan-for-business-growth-and-
transformation  (accessed 31st March 2019.) 
17 See Mihir Naniwadekar and Umakanth Varotil, ‘The Stakeholder Approach Towards Directors’ 
Duties Under Indian Company Law: A Comparative Analysis’ in Mahendra Pal Singh (ed.) The 
Indian Yearbook of Company Law (OUP, 2016) 95-120. 
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means of redress that shareholders enjoy in the event that those interests are 
not promoted.18 As a result, reducing overheads, in a manner that could 
potentially negatively affect the environment, communities or  other 
stakeholders can be legitimate so long as it complies with the law of the 
jurisdiction concerned and is considered, on a commercial basis, to be in the best 
interests of the company. As a result of these component parts of the legal 
construct of the company in its current form,  there are many instances where 
the result of companies’ operations are water or air pollution, deforestation, 
poor labour standards, infringements of peoples’ human rights, poor 
construction standards, communities being relocated, habitats being destroyed 
and ecosystems being permanently damaged or simply a heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels. 
 
The integral function that directors’ duties have alongside ‘separate legal 
personality’ and ‘limited liability’ in attracting and maintaining investment in 
companies means that alternative interpretations of directors’ duties alone, face 
serious practical hurdles.19 This is highlighted by those jurisdictions that have 
introduced mandatory requirements for company directors to take into account 
factors other than the financial interest of the company and shareholders’ 
interests when making decisions (these are discussed in more detail in the next 
section).20 It can be argued that without providing an alternative design concept 
of the overall legal construct of the company itself, that takes into account the 
role that each component part has in the protection of shareholders’ interests, 
there can be limitations to the effectiveness of ESG initiatives.  
 
3.  The Relationship of ESG Interventions with the Legal 
Construct of the Company 
 
This section considers the different types of  ESG initiatives that have emerged 
with  a view to determining their purpose vis à vis directors’ fiduciary duties  and 
the broader legal construct of the company.  It does this by considering the 
mechanisms through which they are designed and determines whether each 
initiative can be categorised as a: 
 
a) A Reputational Initiative - One which has the purpose of influencing the 
decision-making of companies through the effect that it can have on their 
reputation; or 
 
                                                        
18 Ibid.  
19 See R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, (Pitman, 1984) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christopher Stoney and Diana Winstanley, ‘Stakeholding: 
Confustion or Utopia? Mapping the Conceptual Terrain’ (2001) 38 J. Management Stud. 603; Jörg 
Andriof, Sandra Waddock, Bryan Husted, Sandra Sutherland (Eds), Unfolding Stakeholder 
Thinking (Taylor Francis, 2002); Andrew Keay, ‘Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got 
what it takes?’ (2010) 9(3) Richmond. J. Global Law & Business 249-300; Sjåfell, Johnston, Anker-
Sørensen, and Millon (n 2) 79-147. 
20 See S. 172 Companies Act (2006) United Kingdom; see John Edward Parkinson, Corporate 
Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 
304ff. 
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b) A Legal Compliance Initiative – One which creates legislation that directly or 
indirectly affects corporate decision-making but which does not directly affect 
the core legal duty that companies have to make decisions which are in the best 
interests of the company; or 
 
c) A Legal Construct Initiative – One which modifies or alters the duty that 
company directors’ have to act in the best interests of the company or another 
aspect of the legal construct of the company. 
 
This analysis provides the foundation for the latter stages of the article which 
considers the effects of these interventions in practice, their limitations and what 
that means for further development and reform. 
 
3.1 International Organisations 
 
Relevant initiatives by international organisations can be traced back to the 
1970s when the UN was starting to take steps to respond to the unwanted ESG 
impacts of trans-national corporations (TNC).21  Reports from that period  
include an attempt to develop an operable code of conduct for TNCs.22  In 2000 
the UN launched its Global Compact,23 a voluntary membership scheme that 
corporations can subscribe to which requires that they report on the actions that 
they have adopted relating to ESG issues. This initiative has been widely 
accepted by many large corporations, states and the NGO community although 
its non-mandatory nature means that it is inherently limited as a solution. 
 
Shortly after this, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council (UN Sub Commission) 
mandated a working group to develop a set of norms that transnational 
corporations would be obliged to follow. The norms (Draft Norms) that followed 
were approved by the UN Sub-Commission.24  They did not however meet with 
the approval of  many national governments and were particularly criticised for 
failing to adequately address the legal difficulties inherent in attempting to 
impose international human rights and international environmental law norms 
on non-state actors such as corporations.25 
 
Following the rejection of the Draft Norms, the UN in 2005 appointed Prof. John 
Ruggie as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to consider 
how responsibility for human rights issues could be incorporated into business 
practice. Prof. Ruggie’s work resulted in a final report which advocated a 
                                                        
21 Early evidence is found in Multinational Corporations in World Development (United Nations, 
1973).  
22 United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. See ‘Official Records of the 
Economic and Social Council’ (E/5655, E/C.10/6. 59th Session, Supplement No 12). 
23 United Nations Global Compact. www.ungloablcompact.org/ (accessed 23. Feb. 2019). 
24 Human Rights resolution 2003/16, U. N. Doc. CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L. 11 at 52 (2003). 
25 See L. Catá Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of Corporate Responsibility 
in International Law’ Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. Vol. 37 2005, 101-92. 
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‘protect, respect and remedy’ approach.26 This meant that states are expected to 
protect human rights, businesses are expected to ‘respect’ human rights and 
greater judicial and non-judicial remedies should be made available for the 
victims of human rights violations resulting from business activities. Since then 
there has been much work which has sought to clarify how businesses can 
‘respect’ human rights and this has gradually had some influence on business 
practice.27 Rather than seeking to modify directors’ duties intrinsically or any 
other aspect of the legal construct of the company, Ruggie’s approach was to 
develop a sense of international responsibility that all businesses should abide 
by. 
 
Another example of an international organisation taking steps are the initiatives 
developed by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) which has developed guidelines addressed to governments that 
multinationals should comply with.28 These are non-binding principles relating 
to business conduct that provide a multilateral code to which governments agree 
businesses should comply. However these too are non-binding and do not have 
any intrinsic impact upon the law within individual jurisdictions relating to the 
core components of the legal construct of the corporation. 
 
These types of initiatives provide opportunities for companies to comply with 
non-legally binding standards and as such can be categorised as ‘reputational 
initiatives’, as they rely on commercial awareness to ensure that businesses 
maintain sound reputations in the market place. This can and does mean in 
practice, that where there is no relevant national law, and where the 
reputational damage of failing to address an ESG concern is less commercially 
onerous than the cost of taking the appropriate action, boards of directors may 
not be easily persuaded to make the financial investment.  Therefore the impact 
of international initiatives of the type mentioned above means that the severity 
of the reputational, and hence the commercial risk, for the business can 
determine the extent to which they are taken into account by directors. 
 
3.2 Legislation and Regulation 
 
Interventions with ostensibly more direct influence have come in the form of a 
variety of types of legislation and regulation. For example some jurisdictions do 
require increased reporting from companies relating to the decisions that they 
have taken relating to ESG issues. The EU has introduced the Non-Financial and 
Diversity Disclosure Directive that requires large companies to publish 
information related to ESG issues.29 Similarly in the United States at the Federal 
level, the Dodd Frank Act requires companies purchasing certain minerals to 
                                                        
26 United Nations Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of all Human rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (2011). 
27 J. G. Ruggie, Just Business,  (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.) 2013. 
28 OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011). 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines/ (accessed: 23rd Feb. 2019); see also Principles of 
Responsible Investment (UNPRI) www.unpri.org (accessed 23rd Feb. 2019). 
29 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014. 
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conduct ‘due diligence’ investigations relating to their source to ensure that they 
are not procuring ‘conflict minerals’.30 Such initiatives can be categorised as 
‘legal compliance initiatives’ as they place mandatory obligations upon the 
operations of companies but do not affect the core legal construct of the 
company itself.  
 
As has been mentioned, steps to actually amend the nature of directors’ duties 
themselves have been taken place in certain jurisdictions. The United Kingdom 
was the first to make such a move through its Companies Act 2006 which 
requires company directors to take certain ESG considerations into account in 
their decision-making.31 In other jurisdictions such as Canada, the courts have 
determined that boards of directors can take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders that may be relevant to the success of the company. In the case of 
BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008]32 the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty is owed to the company but that in considering the 
‘best interests’, the board may need to consider the interests of other 
stakeholders to achieve good business decisions.  More recently the French 
government has been considering amending its civil code to include a ‘purpose’ 
for companies that incorporates a responsibility to take into account the 
environmental and social impacts of their activities.33 If that legislation is passed, 
it will take time for its true influence and scope to fully emerge. These types of 
interventions do provide evidence that ‘stakeholder theory’ or the more nuanced 
Enhanced Shareholder Value (ESV) approach is, to a certain degree at least, given 
leverage within numerous legal systems even if it has not yet materialised as a 
driving force for decision-making in practice.34  
 
These types of developments that can be categorised as ‘legal construct 
initiatives’ as they have an impact on the actual fiduciary duties that company 
directors have. However, in a jurisdiction such as India where corporate law, 
ostensibly at least gives the appearance of ranking other stakeholders  with the 
same level of importance as that of shareholders,35 there is evidence directors 
still make decisions that place commercial interests above those of 
environmental and social issues.36  This article argues that these types of drafting 
adjustments to directors’ duties do not affect the overall role that directors’ 
duties 37 play within the broader legal construct of the company, which is 
designed to attract and maintain investment for commercial purposes. It is also 
pertinent to note that no jurisdiction has sought to legislate in a manner that 
would affect the other two components of the legal construct of the company i.e. 
‘separate legal personality’ and ‘limited liability’. 
                                                        
30 The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203). 
31 Companies Act s. 172(1)(d). 
32 3 S.C.R 550. 
33 The proposed PACTE law (‘Plan d’action pour la croissance et la transformation des 
enterprises’) would amend article 1833 of the Civil Code to  require all companies to include 
concern of environmental and social impacts in their purposes. 
34 See Freeman (n 19); Stoney & Winstanley (n 19) 603; Andriof et. al (n 19); Keay (n 19) 249-
300.  
35 Companies Act 2013 s. 166(2). 




3.3 Non-Governmental Organisations’ Interventions 
 
Finally the interventions of non-state actors need to be considered as they 
represent a significant proportion of the work that has been carried out in this 
sphere to date.  One of the main influences that non-governmental organisations  
(NGO) have had is to publicise the operations of companies that have been 
prejudicial to ESG interests. However, there also non-state actors whose work 
has sought to create frameworks, guidelines, codes and standards for businesses 
to comply with. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an example; it is a multi-
stakeholder initiative that has developed voluntary standards that businesses 
dealing in timber can comply with to obtain certification that grants them 
market access to those customers that exclude purchases from non-participants 
of the scheme.38 This type of incentive for a business is very much ‘a reputational 
initiative’ that ties in directly with market access, although motivation for 
adopting FSC standards can vary. 
 
However probably more prominently in this context NGOs and companies 
themselves have developed ESG reporting schemes.39 The proliferation of such 
schemes has highlighted the work that companies are doing to respond to ESG 
concerns. Additionally certain stock exchanges have created indices and listings 
for companies that comply with specific ESG criteria.  Notably, none of these 
interventions by NGOs have a direct impact on directors’ duties or the broader 
legal construct of the company. Therefore they can be classified as ‘reputational 
initiatives’ that seek to create commercial pressure on directors by developing 
greater awareness for investors, customers and employees of the performance of 
a company  vis à vis  ESG issues. 
 
 
4. Analysis of the Effect of ESG Initiatives on the Fiduciary Duties 
of Corporate Decision-Makers. 
 
 
This section provides an analysis of business decision-making in practice to 
investigate any ‘upper limit’ in influence that ESG initiatives may have. This is 
done by considering decision-making that involves the interface between ESG 
interests and the constraints that directors face due to their fiduciary duties and 
the overall legal construct of the company. To carry out this analysis, a series of 
semi-structured interviews with 18 different heads of corporate responsibility 
from 15 companies was undertaken.40 All of the interviews were anonymous 
                                                        
38 Forest Stewardship Council, https://ic.fsc.org  (accessed: 23rd Feb. 2019); see G. Auld, 
Constructing Private Governance: The Rise and Evolution of Forest, Coffee, and Fisheries 
Certification, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) 2. 
39  See e.g., The Global Reporting Initiative.  https://www.globalreporting.org (accessed: 23rd Feb. 
2019). 
40 Interviews undertaken between 8th November 2017  and 29th April 2018. All interview 
recordings are held on file with the author.  The term ‘head of corporate responsibility’ is used 
generically. In once case the individual was a CEO. All of the participants took overall 
responsibility for the management of ESG concerns within their respective companies. The 
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which meant that interviewees could speak freely and express personal views 
where appropriate.  
 
The  interview analysis is separated into two categories which relate to ‘general 
business strategies’ on the one hand and ‘investment decision making’ on the 
other. Analysis in the first category of ‘general business strategies’ relates to the 
ESG decision-making of the large majority of businesses, in other words those 
involved in the production, supply and delivery of a wide range of products, 
resources and services. Therefore the analysis considers how those companies 
make decisions relating to the impacts that their businesses can have on ESG 
issues. Analysis in the second category of ‘investment decision making’ relates to 
companies that have an entirely different relationship with ESG interests as they 
need to make assessments of the ESG performance of  the companies that they 
are considering investing in, or which they already hold as investments. 
 
However, within all of the decision-making that is surveyed, the analysis draws 
from the responses to understand whether there is an upper limit to the extent 
that ESG initiatives can influence  board level decision-making.   
 
4.1 General Business Strategies 
 
In the responses that were given by the interviewees certain  key themes 
recurred. The was a stated willingness of directors to seek to understand the 
concerns of a range of different stakeholders. However, tied to this willingness 
was a concern related to the potential commercial impact of failing to do so. For 
example Interviewee 4 explained that ESG concerns play a part in his company’s 
approach to maintaining support from a spectrum of stakeholders that his 
business relies on to be successful, 
 
 I have to have the support of the people I deal with and if I have their 
 support I will continue to be in existence, so therefore I need to 
 identify who the people are that I deal with, who our stakeholders are, 
 and our stakeholders really broadly fit into four buckets.41 
 
He went on to explain that those four buckets related to customers, communities, 
employees and partners and that taking their concerns seriously involved the 
integral and careful management of ESG considerations such as labour 
standards, environmental protection and proper consultation with 
communities.42 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
companies themselves, with the exception of two of the asset management companies, were at 
the time of the interviews, listed on sustainability indices of either the Dow Jones or FTSE stock 
exchanges. Of the two asset management companies, each managed in excess of 200bn USD 
worth of assets worldwide. The companies came from a variety of sectors including banking, 
insurance, asset management, retail,  aerospace engineering, information technology, 
pharmaceuticals, mineral extraction and food manufacturing.   
41 Interview 007. London (UK). 8th December 2017. 
42 Ibid; see academic arguments for such an approach e.g. Elizabeth C. Kuruz et al. ‘The Business 
Case for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Andrew Crane et. al. The Oxford Handbook of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP, 2008) 83, 86. 
 11
It is clear that for many companies that are highly visible to the public, a good 
reputation with certain stakeholders  vis à vis ESG factors can be an important 
component in their commercial success. However this response corresponds to 
classical critique of stakeholder theory, that the ultimate goal for the business is 
commercial success and that ESG concerns need to be managed in a way that 
enable that goal to be realised.43 Interviewee 17 from a data technology company 
gave a similar response in terms of the effect that ESG performance can have 
upon the recruitment of employees. She stated that, 
 
 Another challenge is about the transition that we've made, increasingly 
 being a technology company, as many companies are in a competition, I 
 would say a war for talent, we need to make sure that we are 
 competitive as a good place to work.44 
 
The challenge of viability and approval of the various stakeholders ties in with an 
overall theme which certain interviewees termed as their ‘licence to operate’. It 
was clear that many companies especially those with highly visible reputations 
such as banks and food manufacturing companies need to maintain a certain 
degree of approval from the public and those that they deal with in order to 
continue to be commercially successful. Interviewee 14 stated that, ‘what we are 
trying to achieve in the sustainability universe, is to maintain the bank’s social 
licence to operate’.45 This was reiterated by interviewee 16 who said that, ‘you 
could bundle all of this under licence to operate. Any large company that wants 
to be credible needs to be  following the frameworks and ideally beating them 
and having a positive regard to the disclosure of information about ESG risks and 
opportunities.’46 The terminology of a ‘licence to operate’ corresponds longheld 
with theories relating to ‘legitimacy’47 and ‘social contract’48 that overlap with 
interpretations of the application of the  stakeholder theory in practice and 
emphasise the need for companies to ensure that they manage commercial risks 
that have the potential to undermine their position in the marketplace.49 
 
Whilst clearly satisfying the expectation of important stakeholders and 
maintaining a licence to operate are sound commercial practice for the success of 
a company, the difficulty in strategic decision-making can arise where there is a 
conflict or a tension between satisfying ESG concerns and the financial cost of 
doing so. This particular theme was interesting as it demonstrated that 
companies find certain decisions relating to ESG issues much easier than others 
and inevitably commercial factors play an important part. In certain instances,  
                                                        
43 Roby Gray, Reza Kouhy and Simon Lavers, ‘Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting: A 
Review of the Literature and a Longitudinal Study of UK Reporting’ (1995) 8(2) 47-77, 53. 
44 Interview 017. London (UK). 31st January 2018; See also Bode, C., Singh, J., and Rogan, M. 
(2015). Corporate social initiatives and employee retention. Organization Science, 26(6): 1702–
1720. 
45 Interview 014.  London (UK). 10th January 2018. 
46 Interview 016. London (UK) 30th January 2018. 
47 Craig Deegan, Financial Accounting Theory (McGraw Hill, 2014) 343-72. 
48 Ibid 344-7. 
49 Craig Deegan, ‘Introduction: The Legitimacy Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures – A 
Theoretical Foundation’ (2002) 15(3) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 282-311, 
292-5. 
 12
such as in the reduction of carbon emissions, companies have been able to 
rationalise investment in the short term to satisfy longer term commercial gain. 
For example Interviewee 15 stated that, 
 
 with CO2 emissions particularly for manufacturing it is pretty easy 
 right, we are reducing our direct CO2 emissions from manufacturing 
 quite rapidly ….. you give off less CO2, you use less  energy, you 
 cut your costs, it pays back.50  
 
In this scenario, persuading a board of directors to follow a policy is helped 
where there is commercial benefit, at least in the long term.  For example in the 
mineral extraction sector where high volumes of energy and water are often 
required, there can be significant cost implications involved in reducing that 
usage. As Interviewee 12 stated, 
 
 there are costs associated with good ESG performance that’s certainly 
 true. But I think the trick in the private sector at least, is to try to find 
 where there is an alignment between what the world might generally 
 want, as expressed for example through the SDGs, and what’s good for our 
 business.51 
 
This indicates an upper threshold in the extent to which ESG initiatives will be 
supported by boards of directors, that is tied inextricably to the commercial 
impact and performance of the measure concerned.52 This trend is consistent 
with research carried out by Fernando, Sharfman and Uysal of firms in the 
United States.53  They examined the different types of approaches that firms take 
to ESG issues and classified them in two categories. The first related to actions 
that mitigated ESG outcomes that would ultimately expose the company to 
commercial risk which they labelled as ‘toxicity’.54 The second related to actions 
that may have enhanced the company’s reputation, and gone beyond what was 
legally required and management of any conceivable commercial risks, which 
they labelled as ‘greenness’.55 Their analysis demonstrated that those companies 
whose approach to managing ESG risks was to avoid commercial ‘toxicity’ 
attracted more institutional investment than those firms that adopted ‘green 
policies’.56 This provides an insight into the approaches taken by institutional 
investors but also demonstrates that directors of companies are under pressure 
to manage ESG risks with strategies that are beneficial commercially.  It also 
emphasises the different approaches that firms can take to ESG issues. Rather 
than being a factor that polarises companies between those that act responsibly 
vis à vis ESG issues and those that don’t, the evidence shows that corporate 
                                                        
50 Interview 015. London (UK). 11th January 2018. 
51 Interview 012. Johannesburg (South Africa) 21st December 2018. 
52 David Vogel, ‘Is there a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2005) Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 19, 29. 
53 Chitru. S. Fernando, Mark P. Sharfman and Valnap B. Uysal, ‘Corporate Environmental Policy 
and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money’ (2017) 52(5) Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 2023-2051. 
54 Ibid 2024 
55 Ibid  
56 Ibid 2045. 
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decision-making in this regard is more complex, and that the materiality of ESG 
issues are often recognised as issues that require meticulous financial risk 
calibration.57  
 
Whilst this upper threshold for the acceptance of ESG measures by boards of 
directors ultimately becomes an issue of commercial judgment, its presence was 
indicated very clearly by interviewee 2 who stated that, ‘if we come in with a 
wonderful idea and that’s going to reduce our profit by X per cent, that will be a 
hard pitch.’58  This commercial influence in ESG related risks, is illustrated 
further by those issues that are particularly difficult to solve. An example of an 
ESG issue that is particularly challenging is palm oil consumption.  Whilst the 
production of palm oil is not intrinsically harmful in itself, it has been associated 
with a number of negative environmental impacts including deforestation and 
habitat loss.59 Those issues are further complicated by the political and economic 
pressures related to development and the sovereignty of the producing state. 
Such issues can be challenging for individual companies to engage with when 
palm oil is sold as a commodity and sourced from a large numbers of suppliers, 
rather than from individual plantations. 
 
 This leaves a dilemma for those businesses that are engaged in the use of palm 
oil as an integral part of their business. Interviewee 15 stated that,  ‘for the 
commoditised raw materials something like palm oil or sugar, they might be 
bought many times, aggregated, all of those things and they are traded like oil.’60 
Therefore doing the right thing from an ESG perspective becomes more 
challenging unless palm oil is eradicated as a component resource within the 
products that the business is producing. In this instance the industry may 
attempt to take steps in accordance with certain ESG initiatives, however the 
demand for related products and the willingness of investors to reap the benefits 
of such business mean that decisions related to a company’s involvement in the 
procurement of palm oil will ultimately be heavily influenced by commercial 
factors and these can outweigh the potentially very high cost of introducing 
effective mechanisms to ensure that those resources are purchased from sources 
that all have high environmental and human rights standards.61 
 
In terms of the fiduciary duties that directors have, such conduct is consistent 
with decision-making that is being made in the ‘best interest of the company’ in 
the traditional sense that it corresponds with decision-making that is ultimately 
looking to maximise the profit for the shareholder and the company as a whole.  
Therefore this supports the argument that there is a clear upper commercial 
limit that restrains the ESG related measures that companies will take. However, 
a prominent factor evidenced from those companies surveyed was that they are 
                                                        
57 Ibid  
58 Interview 002, Munich (Germany). 17th November 2017. 
59 See for example, Elsa M. Ordway, Rosamond L. Naylor, Raymond N. Nkongo, Eric F. Lambin, ‘Oil 
Palm Expansion in Cameroon: Insights into Sustainability Opportunities and challenges in Africa’ 
(2017) 47 Global Environmental Change, 190-200. 
60 Interview 015 (n 45). 
61 Nick Pelosi and Rebecca Adamson, ‘Managing the ‘S’ in ESG: The Case of Indigenous Peoples 
and Extractive Industries’ Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (2016) 28(2) Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 87-95. 
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looking to the interests of the company in the ‘long term’ as ESG risks can have 
long lead times.  
 
The ‘long-term’ understanding of ESG risks and opportunities was one that many 
interviewees echoed. Interviewee 8 from the property development sector 
explained that for them, 
 
  ‘its about future proofing the business so its about being the developer of 
 choice so that a local authority thinks, I want it to be X company that does 
 that development in my area. So by demonstrating that we can positively 
 respond to challenges like climate change or on the social side to 
 community issues it positions the brand and business very well.’62 
 
For interviewee 11 from the mineral and mining sector, made the link between 
ESG risk and commercial success in the long term was made more explicitly by 
stating that, ‘certainly in the longer term good ESG performance is required for 
profitability.’63 In both instances the decision-making carried out at board level 
with regard to ESG issues was one of ‘materiality’ or ‘financial risk’ rather than 
adopting policies that are sympathetic towards ESG issues purely for their own 
sake. These responses are consistent with the analysis of Fernando, Sharfman 
and Uysal.64 and reflect the influence that investors have in board level 
strategies.65 This leads to the next section which looks more closely at the way 
that asset managers consider ESG issues in the context of the companies that 
they invest in. 
 
4.3  Investment Decision-Making 
 
The priorities of company directors’ emphasis on commercial performance is 
also seen in the relationship between directors’ fiduciary duties and ESG 
performance in companies involved in making investments and asset 
management.66 The competition in the asset management industry to yield the 
best possible financial returns for clients is a significant driver in decision-
making. For example interviewee 001 stated that as an asset manager it was his 
clients that were the key influence in the manner in which he integrated ESG 
concerns into the development of asset portfolios not ESG concerns for their own 
sake. He stated that, ‘our role is to provide solutions to client’s needs so that is 
the key driver bar nothing, it is interest and demand.’67  
 
What this means in practice is that the extent to which ESG concerns will be 
integrated into the decisions relating to which companies to invest in, will to a 
                                                        
62 Interview 8, London (UK), 8th December 2017. 
63 Interview 11, Johannesburg (South Africa), 21st December 2017. 
64 Fernando, Sharfman & Uysal (n 58) 2045. 
65 Liliana Eva Donath, Roxana Loan and Tatenda Mandimutsira, ‘Evaluating the Performance of 
Socially Responsible Investment Funds’ (2018) 65(2) Scientific Annals of Economics and 
Business 139-58, 154-8. 
66 See Susan N. Gary, ‘Values and Value: University Endowments, Fiduciary Duties, and ESG 
Investing’  (2106) 42 J. C. & U. L. 247; for  fiduciary duties generally: D. Gordon Smith and Andrew 
S. Gold (Eds) Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
67 Interview 001. London (United Kingdom) 8th November 2017. 
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large extent be determined by clients rather than by asset managers themselves. 
As interviewee 1 stated, ‘the point of investments in the capital markets is to 
generate a return to meet whatever liabilities commitments or obligations or 
mission they have elsewhere.’68 This is not to say that there is no socially 
responsible investment (SRI),69 however it was clear from the interviews 
undertaken that at this time it remains a limited proportion of overall 
investment.70 Interviewee 3 another asset manager, illustrated this by explaining 
the types of industries that certain clients will exclude from their investment 
portfolios, ‘tobacco is the most common, tobacco, arms, gambling, and we are 
seeing more carbon related  interest as well in terms of carbon exclusions, they 
are usually around sub-technologies, energy products such as thermal, coal and 
tar sands rather than carbon more generally.’71 
 
Interviewee 6 whose company invested its own funds as well as those of others 
put it like this, 
 
 we have never really believed in exclusions, to say that we are not 
 going  to invest in certain industries and certain companies, but we 
 have such an exclusion for banned weapons and anti-personnel 
 land mines because that is a business that should not be in  existence, 
 there’s no good in that business, similarly we made a decision to 
 exclude coal in terms of the investment and underwriting of 
 thermal coal companies.’72  
 
Evidence suggests that some investors will seek to develop their portfolios 
excluding specific industries, however that influence is still quite limited.73  
 
Research by Duuren, Plantinga and Scholtens, specifically considered the way 
that asset managers made decisions relating to ESG issues for conventional 
investment funds (non SRI funds).74 Their findings support the conclusion drawn 
from the interviewees in this study that ESG information for conventional 
investment funds, is being used to manage  commercial risk.75 They state that, 
‘we find that ESG information in particular is being used for red flagging and to 
manage risk. We find that many conventional fund managers have already 
adopted features of responsible investing in the investment process.’76 
 
                                                        
68 Ibid 
69 The term ‘Socially Responsible Investment’ has been given various definitions. See for 
example: Eurosif, ‘European SRI Study 2018’ Available at: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/sustainable-dev/lu-
european-sri-study-2018.pdf (Accessed 9th April 2019). 
70 See Hong, H., & Kacperczyk, M. (2009) 93 ‘The Price of Sin: The Effect of Social Norms on 
Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics’ 93, 15–36; Thomas C. Berry and Joan C. Junkus, Socially 
Responsible Investing: An Investor Perspective, (2013) 112, J. Bus. Ethics 707-20. 
71 Interview 003. Edinburgh (United Kingdom) 22nd November 2017. 
72 Interview 006. Zurich (Switzerland) 1st December 2017. 
73 Donath, Loan & Mandimutsira (n 65) 154. 
74 Emiel van Duuren,  Auke Plantinga and Bert Scholtens, ‘ESG Integration and the Investment 
Management Process: Fundamental Investing Reinvented’ (2016) 138 J. Bus. Ethics 525–533  
75 Ibid 525. 
76 Ibid 
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A good example of an ESG risk that also represents a commercial risk is that of 
fossil fuels as coal-fired power stations are on the decline and therefore 
associated investments can represent long-term commercial risks. As 
interviewee 2 stated, ‘coal is on the decline in the long term economically, 
therefore they can reduce investments in it. Therefore the two interests 
coincide.’77  In 2015 a report partly funded by the United Nations Environment 
Programme strongly advocated that asset managers should integrate ESG 
concerns into their analysis of their investments and that,  
 
 fiduciary duties have played and continue to play, a critical role in 
 ensuring that fiduciaries are loyal to their beneficiaries  and carry out 
 their duties in a prudent manner. However, we conclude that action is 
 needed to modernise definitions and interpretations of the fiduciary 
 duty in a way that ensures these duties are relevant to 21st century 
 investors.78 
 
The report goes on to advocate that greater consideration should be given by 
asset managers to ESG issues.79 
 
However the evidence from this research has demonstrated that for asset 
managers, normal business practice is to consider the commercial implications 
of any investment and if ESG issues have a part to play in that process, they 
should be taken into consideration. As interviewee 3 explained, ‘that’s not to say 
that we are amoral but the challenge for my team is for our clients and they are 
often large clients who have already had the ethical debate and therefore for my 
team to impose our own ethical values can be a bit of a stretch.’80 
 
As such an asset manager will not necessarily  avoid the inclusion of companies 
that have poor ESG performance unless that ESG factor represents a material 
commercial risk to the investor. Interviewee 3, explained that, 
 
 I think its fair to say that for an unrestricted mainstream equity fund 
 where the mandate is to do as well as you can for that client, the 
 ultimate  decision is about the investment outlook. The longer the 
 term of your investment, the more likely it is that ESG will be a 
 factor, but it will be considered as more of a headwind than an 
 existential challenge, and we might still choose to hold that 
 company.81 
 
Therefore the concern for ESG issues is affecting the way that investment 
decisions are being made, but there is clearly an ‘upper limit’ in the effectiveness 
of that influence which is dictated to a very large extent by commercial 
                                                        
77 Interview 002 (n 58). 
78 Rory Sullivan, Will Martindale, Elodie Feller and Anna Bordon, ‘Fiduciary Duty in the 21st 
Century’ (United Nations Global Compact, UNEP Finance Initiative, Principles for Responsible 
Investment and Inquiry: Design  of a Sustainable Financial System, 2015) 9. 
79  Ibid at 10. 
80 Interview 003 (n 71). 
81 Ibid. 
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considerations.82 As Interviewee 9 put it, ‘ES and G, is not about morals its about 
the actual risks and opportunities to a particular business.’83   
 
There is another factor that needs to mentioned and this is the role that asset 
management companies undertake in ‘stewardship’ of the investments that they 
hold.84 Where asset managers do raise concerns or request information from 
companies that they hold relating to aspects of ESG performance, it can influence 
associated decision-making. Naturally companies can be responsive as the asset 
managers can potentially withdraw holdings. Whilst the influence of this type of 
‘stewardship’ is growing, it is currently only having a limited overall effect on the 
ESG performance of companies. 
 
In sum therefore, current practice sees asset managers considering ESG risks, 
but within an overall process of commercial risk management. 
 
5. How can the analysis inform approaches to the protection of ESG 
interests. 
 
Whatever arguments exist as to the obligations that directors and as a 
consequence companies should owe to ESG issues,85 the analysis shows that 
companies naturally prioritise commercial performance. This is consistent with 
the argument that the duty to ‘act in the best interests of the company’ functions 
as an essential component in the tripartite legal construct (including ‘separate 
legal personality’ and ‘limited liability’) that is oriented towards protecting the 
commercial interests of investors. However what the analysis has also shown is 
that pressure from ESG initiatives has irrevocably altered the range of factors 
that companies now need to take into account when they make commercial 
decisions that can be considered to be in the ‘best interests of a company’.86 This 
is because a company’s performance vis à vis ESG issues can have commercial 
impacts that are related to a company’s reputation, legitimacy, its licence to 
operate (or social contract) and other factors such as its ability to attract good 
quality employees.  
 
The evidence demonstrates that company directors will only allow ESG factors to 
influence their decision-making to the extent that they have the potential to have 
an effect on the commercial success of the business. It shows that where it is 
possible for a company to make decisions which have positive outcomes for ESG 
                                                        
82 Bob Herz and Jean Rogers, ‘Measuring What Matters: Industry Specificity Helps Companies and 
Investors Gain Traction on Sustainability’ (2016) 28(2) J. Applied Corp. Finance 34-8. 
83 Interview 009. Edinburgh (United Kingdom) 11th December 2017. 
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issues without incurring significant overheads, boards are easily persuaded. 
However where there may be a conflict between non-mandatory ESG initiatives 
and the need to perform commercially, boards of directors are less easily 
convinced. 
 
This approach is consistent with the guidance of regulators in some jurisdictions 
who have been required to indicate the proper interpretation of fiduciary duties 
relating to ESG risks. For example in the United States the Department of Labor 
issued guidance in 2015 that environmental, social and governance issues “are 
proper components of the fiduciary’s primary analysis,...so long as the 
investment is economically equivalent, with respect to return and risk to 
beneficiaries of the economic merits of competing investment choices.”87 
 
This suggests that the effectiveness of non-mandatory ESG initiatives, exist 
within a paradigm that is ultimately subject to the vagaries of the market.  Those 
limitations on the manner in which governance relating to ESG concerns is 
currently designed should inform the manner in which ESG initiatives are 
designed in the future.  For the purpose of this discussion, interventions have 
been grouped into three categories ‘reputational initiatives’ ‘legal compliance 
initiatives’ and ‘legal construct initiatives’. The question in terms of government 
and governance, is what blend of these types of interventions can be the most 
effective in achieving effective ESG performance without hampering business 
and investment.  
 
With regard to ‘legal construct initiatives’ requiring the re-design of aspects of 
the traditional legal construct of the company itself, attempts to do so have 
already occurred and are still occurring in some jurisdictions.88 Whilst certain 
states have experimented very tentatively with this approach, lessons from the 
past demonstrate that individual countries will ultimately be unwilling to adopt 
law that places those businesses incorporated under their jurisdiction at a 
competitive disadvantage.89 Therefore if significant steps in this regard are to 
take place it would require a high degree of international consensus. (It must of 
course be noted that there are currently efforts being made at the international 
level to develop a treaty, that if progressed and adopted, would have the effect of 
making corporations and other business entities more clearly accountable to 
international human rights law.90 Whilst such an initiative would definitely be 
beneficial, especially in terms of creating greater clarity relating to due diligence 
and liability,91  it would not change the legal construct of the corporation itself, 
                                                        
87  The US Government, Department of Labor, ‘Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Fiduciary 
Standard under ERISA in Considering Economically Targeted Investments’ Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, 29 CFR Part 2509, RIN 1210-AB73, 26 October 2015. 
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which would still be pre-disposed to decision-making of the manner discussed in 
section 2.) 
 
However, what this analysis suggests is that consideration of an entire re-
appraisal of the design of the corporation as a legal construct is a crucial exercise 
that needs to be undertaken. Sjafjell states that, ‘[w]hile reforming company law 
will not solve all the problems, it is a missing piece of the sustainability puzzle 
that needs to be put in its place. It is also a piece that has tended to be ignored in 
the debate on how to encourage companies to behave in an environmentally and 
socially friendly manner.’92  
 
In terms of external pressure through ‘reputational initiatives’ requiring 
voluntary reporting and certification schemes, the evidence has shown that  the 
different initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines, the GRI, 
the UNPRI and the sustainability indices, have had a significant impact in 
changing the decision-making attitudes and approaches of company directors as 
they have raised the ‘materiality’ of a whole range of ESG factors in commercial 
decision-making. However they have extrinsic limitations which are 
compounded by a lack of consistency and competition between schemes, the lack 
of clarity or applicability of requirements for different sectors, and the lack of 
comprehensive uptake or engagement by all companies. Therefore whilst such 
approaches have certain merit their inherent inadequacies need to be taken into 
account. It is possible that they represent  pioneering stages that are paving the 
way for more adequate systems or frameworks rather than long term solutions 
in themselves. 
 
By process of elimination, in the short term at least, we turn to ‘legal compliance 
initiatives’. There is a strong case for closer consideration of the use of law and 
regulation as an intervention to steer company directors towards decision-
making that aligns the operations of companies with more positive ESG 
outcomes. Traditionally of course the response from business and industry is 
that law and regulation should be kept to a minimum to ensure that businesses 
are not constrained by ‘red-tape’.93 This reluctance is also reflected to a large 
degree by the policies of many governments on the issue.94 From a theoretical 
standpoint too, there have been long-standing debates relating to the use of 
regulation to affect the decision-making of companies.95 The arguments concern 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pd
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93  Daniel Kinderman, ‘The Struggle over the EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive’ 8/2015 WSI-
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94 See for example EU ‘Non-Financial Reporting Directive’ Directive 2014/95/EU provides in the 
preamble recital 13. that  The European Council, in its conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011, 
called for the overall regulatory burden, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(‘SMEs’), to be reduced. 
95 See for example Craig Deegan (n 47) 64-96;  
 20
the merits of government regulation,96 versus approaches that rely on the 
markets to incentivise certain conduct through customer demand.97 
 
Although the evidence from the interviews is limited as it relates only to a small 
number and reflected personal rather than corporate opinion, it did produce 
responses that were counter to those that would be expected from those 
representing a free-market approach to regulation and governance. Clearly 
whilst no industry seeks additional work or intervention that can slow down 
production or the provision of  services, quite a number of the interviewees 
considered that of the different types of intervention, regulation in a variety of 
different forms can be effective. None of them saw regulation as a panacea per se, 
but the trend in the responses was that where it was used in a targeted and well 
considered manner, it has the potential to effectively and fairly steer decision-
making towards positive outcomes for ESG interests.  
 
For  example Interviewee 4 spoke of the need for the government to selectively 
regulate in relation to certain aspects of ESG concerns.98 Interviewee 7 discussed 
the use of regulation to create economic incentives.99 Interviewee 5 stated that, ‘I 
have a personal inclination towards greater regulation, I am not sure if everyone 
in my company would agree with me, but particularly at an international level, 
having consideration to labour standards across different countries, having some 
kind of regulation and enforcement of it would be good.’100  Similarly interviewee 
10 having commented on the influence of reporting frameworks, discussed the 
disparity of regulatory standards between certain jurisdictions.101 Whilst it is 
outside of the scope of this article to consider the wide range of arguments 
relating to different types of regulation, the comments provided act as a prompt 
for a systematic review of the areas within which regulation might provide 
solutions and an analysis of the types of regulation that would be most 





This article has shown that directors’ duties are just one component in a very 
resilient tripartite legal construct that includes ‘separate legal personality’ and 
‘limited liability’.  That legal construct has been adopted ubiquitously in the 
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Financial Disclosure Regulation: A Critical Assessment’  (1983) J. Accounting & Public Policy, 2. 
97 M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J. Financial Economics, 305-60. 
98 Interview 004, London (United Kingdom) 24th November 2017. 
99 Interview 007 (n 41). 
100 Interview 005. London (United Kingdom) 24th November 2017. 
101 Interview 10, Gothenburg (Sweden) 19th December 2017. 
102  See also for example, UK Govt. DEFRA, ‘Smarter Environmental Regulation Review – Phase 1 
Report: Guidance and Information Obligations’ (2013) Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1998
68/serr-phase1-130516.pdf (Accessed 10th April 2019); also BuroHappold, ‘Help or Hindrance? 
Environmental Regulations and Competitiveness’ (Aldersgate Group, 2017) Available at: 
http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/latest/detail:beyond-red-tape-smart-regulations-are-key-to-
delivering-uk-industrial-and-environmental-ambitions (Accessed: 10th April 2019). 
 21
corporate law of countries around the world as it has been an effective format 
for business to attract and maintain investment. The analysis has shown that the 
tripartite legal construct of the company, is inherently designed to protect the 
interests of investors and as such plays a commanding influence on the way that 
corporate decision-makers make decisions. Unfortunately that design is also pre-
disposed to producing certain unwanted outcomes relating to ESG issues.  
 
The article has assessed the effectiveness of existing ESG initiatives. It has shown 
that if ESG policies and strategies cannot be aligned with long-term commercial 
success, boards of directors will be reluctant to incorporate them. This ultimately 
means that an ‘upper limit’ to the effectiveness of non-mandatory ESG initiatives 
exists. This ‘upper limit’ requires other types of intervention to be developed. 
This article has suggested that whilst traditionally the business community will 
push back against additional law and regulation, it can actually garner support 
where it is introduced fairly and equitably. This is especially the case for those 
companies that actively take ESG concerns seriously as part of their business 
practices.  
 
What this article also demonstrates is that there is a broader long-term case for 
reconsidering the design of the legal construct of the company itself. The existing 
design has been extremely successful over the last 220 years in providing a 
medium for businesses to attract and maintain investment. However, it has been 
less successful in terms of the impacts that companies have had on peoples’ 
human rights and the environment.  The article has demonstrated that a re-
design of the corporation as a legal construct requires a process that takes into 
account all aspects of its key components rather than isolating and solely 
focussing upon directors’ duties. What is also clear is that whatever re-design or 
new framework might be envisaged for the future, it would need to incorporate 
mechanisms that would ultimately continue to encourage investors and protect 
their interests if the corporation is to continue to be successful as a medium for 
business in free market economies.  
